
A Collective Self-Esteem Scale: Self-Evaluation of One's Social Identity

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Social identity theory as developed by Tajfel and Turner argues that there are two distinct aspects of the self-concept: personal identity and social identity (in American terminology, collective identity). Although many self-esteem measures are available in the literature, they all focus on individuals' evaluation of their personal identity, whether in private or interpersonal domains. No scale currently exists that assesses the positivity of one's social, or collective, identity. A scale was constructed to assess individual differences in collective, rather than personal, self-esteem, with four subscales (Membership esteem, Public collective self-esteem, Private collective self-esteem, and Importance to Identity). Evidence for reliability and validity of the scale was provided by three studies, suggesting that the scale can be a useful research tool. Implications for research and social identity theory are discussed.

The importance of social group memberships to individuals' self-concept and social behavior is explicitly acknowledged in social identity theory (e.g., Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986; Turner, 1982), which posits that the self-concept has two distinct aspects. One is personal identity, which includes specific attributes of the individual such as competence, talent, and sociability. The other aspect is one's social identity, defined as "that part of an individual's self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership in a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership" (Tajfel, 1981, p. 255). According to social identity theory, a social group is a collection of individuals who see themselves as members of the same social category. Accordingly, social identity can derive from a variety of group memberships, including those based on race, gender, and occupation. Whereas personal identity refers to how people view themselves as individuals, social identity refers to how they view the social groups to which they belong.

Whereas European social psychologists like Tajfel and Turner use the term *social identity* in reference to the part of the self-concept that is based on memberships in social groups or categories, in American terminology this is generally referred to as *collective identity*, while *social identity* is used in reference to interpersonal domains and social roles. Cheek and his colleagues (e.g., Cheek, 1989; Cheek, Underwood, & Cutler, 1985) make this distinction explicit by differentiating among three rather than two aspects of identity: personal, social, and collective. Here, personal identity is equivalent to personal identity as discussed by social identity theorists, denoting individuals' personal values, ideas, goals, emotions, and so forth. Social identity, in contrast, differs from what is called social identity in social identity theory; here, it refers to the self in relation to others (i.e., in interpersonal domains), with regard to, for example, one's popularity, attractiveness, reputation, and mannerisms. Collective identity is similar to Tajfel and Turner's social identity, in that it denotes those aspects of the self-concept that relate to race, ethnic background, religion, feelings of belonging in one's community, and the like. The importance of the distinction between personal and collective aspects is also evident in a recent program of research by Triandis and his colleagues (e.g., Hui, 1988; Triandis, 1989; Triandis, Bontempo, Villareal, Asai, &

Authors' Note: This research was supported by National Science Foundation Grant BNS 8520693 to Jennifer Crocker. Portions of this article were presented at the annual meeting of the Eastern Psychological Association, Buffalo, New York, April 1988. We wish to thank Mark Snyder, Sid Shrauger, Jonathan Cheek, and two reviewers for their helpful comments and criticisms regarding earlier versions. Correspondence should be addressed to Riia Luhtanen or Jennifer Crocker, Department of Psychology, Park Hall, SUNY-Buffalo, Buffalo, NY 14260.

PSPB, Vol. 18 No. 3, June 1992 302-318
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Lucca, 1988; Triandis, McCusker, & Hui, 1990), who distinguish between individualism and collectivism—that is, the extent to which personal versus in-group goals, needs, and beliefs are emphasized. Henceforward, in line with American terminology and the distinctions made by Cheek and his colleagues, we will use the terms *collective identity* and *collective self-esteem* to denote those aspects of identity that have to do with memberships in social groups and the value placed on one's social groups, respectively.

Social identity theory (e.g., Tajfel & Turner, 1986) makes explicit the evaluative nature of both personal and social (or, in American terminology, collective) aspects of identity. It posits that individuals strive to maintain or enhance not only a positive personal identity but also a positive collective identity. To the extent that one's social groups are valued and compare favorably with relevant comparison groups, one's collective identity is positive. Tajfel and Turner (1986) outline several strategies that serve to protect or enhance social identity, including social competition, whereby the group members try to enhance their objective position in the society; individual mobility, whereby persons with negative or threatened social identity may leave or dissociate themselves from a social group;¹ and different "social creativity" strategies such as comparing the in-group with the out-group on dimensions that allow for a positive outcome or choosing another out-group with which the in-group is compared.

Other social psychological theories of self-esteem, however, have emphasized the more individualistic, or personal, aspects of the self-concept. Several authors have argued that individuals strive to maintain, protect, and enhance a positive self-image (e.g., Greenwald, 1980; Jones, 1973; Taylor & Brown, 1988; Tesser & Campbell, 1983; Wills, 1981). This self-enhancement tendency is revealed in a variety of social behaviors and cognitions (see Taylor & Brown, 1988, for a review). Recent evidence indicates that personal self-esteem is an important moderator of this tendency and that it is individuals who are high in self-esteem who are most likely to engage in self-enhancement or self-serving biases (e.g., Alloy & Abramson, 1979, 1982; Crocker, Thompson, McGraw, & Ingerman, 1987; Tennen & Herzberger, 1987). Unlike low-self-esteem individuals, they tend to show unrealistically positive views of the self, illusions of control, and unrealistic optimism for the future (see Taylor & Brown, 1988, for a review). Low-self-esteem individuals, in contrast, have been argued to be more self-protective (see Baumeister, Tice, & Hutton, 1989).

The individualistic emphasis is also evident in the measurement of self-esteem. Although the evaluative dimension of the self-concept has long been recognized

and the construct of self-esteem has received a great deal of theoretical and empirical attention (see, e.g., James, 1890/1950; Rosenberg, 1979; Wylie, 1974, 1979), the focus has traditionally been on the personal part of the self-concept, or personal identity. Many measures that assess individual differences in self-esteem are available in the literature (see, e.g., Blascovich & Tomaka, 1990). These scales are typically self-report measures and assess either global self-esteem, an overall evaluative attitude toward the self (e.g., the Rosenberg, 1965, Self-Esteem Scale), or self-esteem specific to particular domains or abilities. Examples of the latter category include the Tennessee Self-Concept Scale (Fitts, 1964), which assesses self-esteem in the physical, moral, personal, family, and social domains; the Janis and Field (1959) Feelings of Inadequacy Scale, which measures self-esteem in social areas; and the Coopersmith (1967) Self-Esteem Inventory, which has been shown to be a multidimensional self-esteem scale covering a variety of areas such as school and family. A common characteristic of the existing self-esteem measures is that they are individualistic, in that they focus on individuals' self-evaluations based on their personal attributes, whether in relation to private or interpersonal domains. As such, these measures assess the level or positivity of individuals' personal identity (and/or what American psychologists call social identity—i.e., social self-esteem; see, e.g., Briggs & Cheek, 1986) and fail to consider the positivity of their collective identity as conceptualized in social identity theory.

We argue that the emphasis on the more individualistic aspects of self-esteem has offered only a partial view of individuals' self-concepts and social behavior. Although researchers working within the framework of social identity theory have largely focused on situational factors that temporarily influence the positivity of one's collective identity, we propose (cf. Markus & Kunda, 1986) that there are also relatively stable individual differences in collective self-esteem, just as there are individual differences in personal and social self-esteem. Furthermore, we argue that whereas personal self-esteem tends to moderate the use of self-serving biases and more individualized self-enhancement tactics, collective self-esteem may be an important moderator of in-group bias, in-group-serving attributions, and other collective, or group-level, strategies discussed in social identity theory.

To date, no scale exists in the literature that measures collective self-esteem in line with social identity theory's conception of collective identity (e.g., Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986; Turner, 1982). One existing scale that purportedly measures collective self-esteem was developed by Breckler, Greenwald, and Wiggins (1986). Their scale is based on a theoretical framework called ego task analysis (Breckler & Greenwald, 1986; Greenwald,

1982), which posits that there are three motivational facets of the self: public, private, and collective. Individuals attempt to establish self-worth within each facet. Although these authors define the collective self as the "we" facet of the self, the achievements in this facet are still conceptualized in very individualistic terms, focusing on the fulfillment of one's individual role within reference groups. The subscale that measures one's esteem with respect to this facet includes items such as "I am a good representative of my school," "I am a cooperative participant in group activities," and "I am active in socially important causes." In other words, the evaluations are very personal in nature, based on how individuals see *themselves* in the context of specific reference groups and group activities.

Although individuals' evaluations of how good they are as members of their social groups may be an aspect of collective self-esteem and an important moderator of social behavior, those evaluations do not appear to capture the sense of collective identity as defined by social identity theory. Tajfel and his colleagues (e.g., Tajfel & Turner, 1986) argue that collective identity may be positive or negative according to the evaluations of *one's social groups*, rather than one's personal attributes or achievements within groups. Social identity is a function of both how one evaluates one's groups and how others evaluate those groups. Furthermore, these authors note that individuals must be subjectively identified with their in-groups (i.e., the in-groups must have some emotional significance to the individuals) for the groups to contribute to the individuals' self-concepts.

A measure of collective self-esteem would be helpful in advancing theory and research examining the interplay between different types of self-esteem. Social identity theory suggests that personal and collective self-esteem are related because they have a common, or shared, core in the self-concept—that is, they both feed into an overall sense of worth, or positivity of the self-concept as a whole (see, e.g., Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Past research appears to support the notion of interplay between the two types of self-esteem; for example, there is some evidence that in-group bias or intergroup discrimination (presumably a behavior that has more direct implications for collective self-esteem) enhances *personal* self-esteem (see Abrams & Hogg, 1988; Luhtanen & Crocker, 1991). Brown, Collins, and Schmidt (1988), for example, have also shown that personal self-esteem moderates in-group favoritism, such that high personal self-esteem individuals display more favoritism when they are directly involved in the group process ("direct self-enhancement") whereas lows are more apt to display favoritism when they are not directly involved ("indirect enhancement"). Further, Cialdini and Richardson (1980),

in their research on "basking in reflected glory," showed that *personal* failure on a test (presumably more of a threat to personal than collective self-esteem) led to enhancing the quality of one's own university while devaluing the quality of a rival university (which appears to more directly enhance collective rather than personal self-esteem). Thus, one type of self-esteem may at times compensate for another, and the ability to measure collective self-esteem alongside personal self-esteem may shed new light on such processes.

A measure of collective self-esteem need not be applicable only to research conducted within the framework of social identity theory. The notion of collective self-esteem may have implications for a variety of social psychological domains and phenomena, including organizational commitment and behavior, political participation, and psychological adjustment. Further, in a recent review of research on ethnic identity, Phinney (1990) noted that ethnic identity and attitudes toward one's ethnic group have been operationalized in many different ways, making comparisons across the results from different studies difficult. In her recommendations for future research, she argued that the most serious need in ethnic identity research is to develop reliable and valid measures.

Because of the need for a scale to assess collective self-esteem in a manner consistent with social identity theory, we developed the present measure. Our collective self-esteem scale attempts to assess individuals' levels of social identity based on their memberships in ascribed groups pertaining to gender, race, religion, ethnicity, and socioeconomic class. There are several reasons for focusing on ascribed rather than acquired group memberships. First, these ascribed group memberships represent identities that apply to everyone, whereas acquired group memberships are much more idiosyncratic. More important, our attempt was to assess global, relatively stable levels of collective self-esteem, parallel to scales (e.g. Rosenberg's, 1965) that measure global, relatively stable personal self-esteem. We also felt that a focus on memberships in acquired groups (such as those based on one's profession, hobbies, or interests) would confound social identity with personal identity, because acquired group memberships are usually due to individual desires, efforts, and achievements. It is plausible, however, that collective self-esteem based on acquired group memberships generalizes to ascribed group memberships, and/or vice versa.

We also hoped to create a single measure that would capture a general, cross-group tendency to have a positive social identity, rather than developing one measure of gender self-esteem, a second measure of racial self-esteem, and so forth. A single, global measure might

enable one to predict responses to a threatened social identity in *new* groups in which individuals find themselves, such as groups created in the laboratory. Moreover, implicit in the use of global self-esteem scales is the assumption that individuals will, by and large, base their overall evaluations on whatever domains or characteristics are the most salient to them personally. In other words, some individuals' judgments of personal worth may be based largely on their academic or job competencies while others' may be based on their interpersonal skills; similarly, some individuals' collective self-esteem may be largely a function of their race while others' may be based mostly on their gender. Taylor and Dube (1986), for example, have argued that despite multiple group memberships or social identities, individuals are able to derive a unitary sense of self, possibly by bolstering identification with social categories whose members share their values. However, at times researchers, depending on their specific purposes, may be better served by a measure that assesses collective self-esteem with regard to a particular social group; to that extent, minor alterations of the scale instructions and wording of items may be appropriate.

SCALE CONSTRUCTION

We decided to include four types of items in our measure, each assessing a possible aspect of collective self-esteem. To take into account Breckler and his colleagues' (e.g., Breckler & Greenwald, 1986; Breckler et al., 1986) conceptualization, we developed items involving individuals' judgments of how good or worthy they are as members of their social groups (e.g., "I am a worthy member of the social groups I belong to"). These items were similar in character to the collective ego task esteem items in the Breckler et al. (1986) scale and were included to assess a possible, albeit the most individualistic, aspect of collective self-esteem (*membership* esteem). The other three types of items were more directly relevant to social identity theory, which considers both self- and perceived other-evaluations of one's social groups to contribute to the positivity of one's collective identity, given that the social groups have some emotional significance to the individual. Thus, *private* collective self-esteem items were included to assess one's personal judgments of how good one's social groups are (e.g., "I feel good about the social groups I belong to"), and *public* collective self-esteem items assessed one's judgments of how other people evaluate one's social groups (e.g., "In general, others respect the social groups that I am a member of"). Importance to *identity* items were developed to assess the importance of one's social group memberships to one's self-concept (e.g., "The social groups I belong to are an important reflection of who I

am"). Initially, 10 items were developed to assess each of these four domains, and 3 additional items were included to assess the importance of being a good group member, of how one feels about one's social groups, and of how others feel about one's social groups. Responses to all 43 items were made on a 7-point Likert-type scale as follows: 1 = *strongly disagree*, 2 = *disagree*, 3 = *disagree somewhat*, 4 = *neutral*, 5 = *agree somewhat*, 6 = *agree*, and 7 = *strongly agree*. The scale was preceded by the following instructions:

We are all members of different social groups or social categories. Some of such social groups or categories pertain to *gender, race, religion, nationality, ethnicity, and socioeconomic class*. We would like you to consider your memberships in those particular groups or categories, and respond to the following statements on the basis of how you feel about those groups and your memberships in them. There are no right or wrong answers to any of these statements; we are interested in your honest reactions and opinions. Please read each statement carefully, and respond by using the following scale:

The initial 43-item measure was first administered to 82 subjects at the beginning of their participation in an experiment by Crocker and Luhtanen (1990), along with the Rosenberg (1965) Self-Esteem Scale and a demographic questionnaire. The Rosenberg scale is a widely used and well-validated measure of global, personal self-esteem, with test-retest reliabilities greater than .80 (see Rosenberg, 1965; Wylie, 1974). The collective self-esteem measure was subjected to a principal components analysis using varimax rotation, which indicated that 55.2% of the variance in the total 43-item scale was accounted for by four factors. To shorten the cumbersome total scale, 4 items were selected for each subscale, resulting in a final 16-item total Collective Self-Esteem Scale.² The items for the four subscales were selected on the basis of their highest loading on the appropriate factor (except for two items with factor loadings of .58 and .62, all the selected items had loadings greater than .70), the item-total correlations (all the selected items correlated with the appropriate subscale score at $r = .55$ or higher), and the criterion that two of the four items for each subscale were to be worded in a negative direction (such items were reverse-scored). The final four-item subscales correlated with the initial subscales in the .90s.

The final 16 items were then submitted to a principal components analysis using varimax rotation, which showed that 72.3% of the total variance was accounted for by four factors. All the items loaded on the appropriate factors, the lowest loading being .58 and the highest .88.³ Reliability analyses indicated that Cronbach's (1951) alpha coefficients and item-total correlations were substantial for the subscales as well as the total scale. The

alpha coefficients ranged from .83 to .88. Item-total correlations ranged from .51 to .80 for the subscales and from .40 to .71 for the total scale, and the average item-total correlations ranged from .55 to .75.

Correlations between the subscales ranged from $r = .21$ (Public and Identity; $p < .05$) to $r = .51$ (Membership and Private; $p < .001$). The total 16-item Collective Self-Esteem Scale correlated moderately with the Rosenberg (1965) Self-Esteem Scale at $r = .34$, $p < .01$, indicating that although collective and personal self-esteem are moderately related, they share only 11.6% of their variance. The Membership subscale correlated the highest with the Rosenberg scale at $r = .47$, $p < .001$, supporting our prediction that this most individualistic subscale would be the most related to personal self-esteem. The correlation with the Private subscale was also significant at $r = .34$, $p < .01$. The Public and Identity subscales had non-significant correlations with the Rosenberg scale ($r = .10$ and $.12$, respectively).

The sample size on which the initial scale construction was based, considering the number of items included in our scale, was inappropriately small for conducting reliable factor analyses (see, e.g., Nunnally, 1978). Consequently, we conducted Study 1 with a larger sample to further investigate the factor structure of our scale. Study 1 was also undertaken to investigate the criterion validity of our scale. We predicted that racial minority groups would exhibit lower levels of public collective self-esteem than Whites. We also predicted that the Public subscale would correlate with the degree to which individuals believe that their race, and possibly also their sex, is discriminated against in the society. In line with research on personal self-esteem failing to show differences between stigmatized (minority) and nonstigmatized (majority) groups (see Crocker & Major, 1989, for a review), we predicted no differences in the extent to which minority and majority subjects would consider themselves to be worthy members of their social groups (the Membership subscale) or in the extent to which minority and majority members would personally view their social groups in a positive light (the Private subscale). Because ethnic and racial group memberships are particularly salient to minorities (e.g., Lau, 1989; McGuire, McGuire, Child, & Fujioka, 1978), they were expected to score higher on the Identity subscale than Whites.

STUDY 1

Method

The 16-item Collective Self-Esteem Scale was administered to approximately 1,200 introductory psychology students during mass testing at the beginning of a semester at a large northeastern university. Of these, 887

students completed the scale.⁴ Included in mass testing were also the Rosenberg (1965) Self-Esteem Scale and an eight-item measure of the extent to which students believed they were discriminated against on the basis of their sex and on the basis of their race (e.g., "To what extent do you feel that you have been personally discriminated against because of your sex (race)?" and "How often have you felt that people of your sex (race) are discriminated against in our society?").⁵ Students were told only that their participation in mass testing was voluntary, that they would receive credit toward their research requirement for their participation, that their participation would give them more opportunities to participate in various studies that require some initial information from mass testing, and that their responses were completely confidential. The measures were completed during one class period. Because many students failed to complete all the scales, sample sizes vary for the correlations. Of those who completed the Collective Self-Esteem Scale and indicated their race, 755 (91.2%) were White, 30 (3.6%) were Black, and 43 (5.2%) were Asian. Approximately 51% of the sample was female.

Results and Discussion⁶

Factor analyses. Principal components factor analysis using varimax rotation specifying four factors replicated the factor pattern found previously. The four factors accounted for 60.7% of the variance. Factor loadings ranged from .54 to .83. Each item clearly loaded on its appropriate factor (four items in each factor), and only five of the minor loadings exceeded .30 (the highest being .44). Table 1 shows the factor loadings.

Because exploratory factor analyses do not allow testing the adequacy of fit of different factor models, such as higher-order, hierarchical models, we also examined four models of the Collective Self-Esteem Scale factor structure using confirmatory factor analyses. We used the maximum likelihood method of estimation in EQS (Bentler, 1989) to test the following models: (a) a one-factor model, (b) a four-factor model where the factors are uncorrelated, (c) a four-factor model where the factors are correlated, and (d) a hierarchical model where four first-order factors are subsumed by a second-order, general collective self-esteem factor and where the first-order factors are restricted to load equally on the second-order factor. The fit of the four models was evaluated using several criteria (see, e.g., Bollen, 1989): the chi-square goodness of fit statistic (where a nonsignificant chi-square indicates excellent model fit), the chi-square/degrees of freedom ratio (generally, values below 2.0 or 3.0 are viewed as acceptable), the Bentler and Bonett (1980) normed fit and nonnormed fit indexes, and the Bentler (1990) comparative fit index

TABLE 1: Factor Loadings for the Collective Self-Esteem Scale Items, Study 1

Subscale and Item	Factor Loading ^a			
	Me	Pr	Pu	Id
Membership				
I am a worthy member of the social groups I belong to. (1)	.68			
I feel I don't have much to offer to the social groups I belong to. (5) ^b	.76			
I am a cooperative participant in the social groups I belong to. (9)	.55			.40
I often feel I'm a useless member of my social groups. (13) ^b	.75			
Private				
I often regret that I belong to some of the social groups I do. (2) ^b		.83		
In general, I'm glad to be a member of the social groups I belong to. (6)	.40	.62		
Overall, I often feel that the social groups of which I am a member are not worthwhile. (10) ^b	.36	.59		
I feel good about the social groups I belong to. (14)	.44	.54		.30
Public				
Overall, my social groups are considered good by others. (3)			.72	
Most people consider my social groups, on the average, to be more ineffective than other social groups. (7) ^b			.76	
In general, others respect the social groups that I am a member of. (11)			.78	
In general, others think that the social groups I am a member of are unworthy. (15) ^b			.78	
Identity				
Overall, my group memberships have very little to do with how I feel about myself. (4) ^b				.72
The social groups I belong to are an important reflection of who I am. (8)				.74
The social groups I belong to are unimportant to my sense of what kind of a person I am. (12) ^b				.77
In general, belonging to social groups is an important part of my self-image. (16)				.75

NOTE: The number in parentheses indicates the sequence of items in the scale. Me = Membership, Pr = Private, Pu = Public, Id = Identity.

a. Only factor loadings equal to or greater than .30 are indicated.

b. Item was reversed for scoring.

(values above .90 on the last three indexes are generally viewed as indicating good fit). Several indexes are reported because none of the individual indexes are unflawed; for example, the chi-square statistic is highly susceptible to influence of sample size and complexity of the model (number of parameters) tested, such that with larger samples and more complex models, perfect or nearly perfect fit is rarely obtained (see, e.g., Bollen, 1989). Of these indexes, only the nonnormed fit index and the comparative fit index are relatively free from the influence of sample size.

Results from confirmatory factor analyses are presented in Table 2. None of the models show a good fit, especially with regard to the chi-square statistic and the chi-square/degrees of freedom ratio. However, the four-factor correlated and the hierarchical models clearly describe the data better than the one-factor and the four-factor uncorrelated models. These two models yield acceptable values for the normed fit, nonnormed fit, and comparative fit indexes, and neither appears to be superior with regard to representing the data. As shown in Table 2, analyses of the data obtained from Studies 2 and 3 (see below) also indicate the superiority of the four-factor correlated and the hierarchical model to the other two models. Note that although the sample size in Study

2 was small for these analyses, replication across the three studies suggests that the solutions are reliable.

Reliability. Reliability analyses again indicated that the scale and its subscales are internally consistent, revealing substantial alphas (ranging from .73 for the Membership subscale to .80 for the Public subscale; total scale alpha was .85) and item-total correlations (ranging from .45 to .66 for the subscales and from .37 to .59 for the total scale; means are reported in Table 3). Similar results were obtained from Studies 2 and 3 (see below), as presented in Table 3.

Subscale correlations. Again, the highest correlation was found between the Membership and Private subscales ($r = .59, p < .001$), and the lowest between the Public and Identity subscales ($r = .23, p < .001$). The patterns of subscale correlations were similar in Studies 2 and 3 (see below). Table 4 presents the subscale correlations.

Validity. Correlations between the Collective Self-Esteem Scale and the Rosenberg (1965) Self-Esteem Scale and the measure of subjects' perceptions of discrimination are presented in Table 5. As before, the Collective Self-Esteem Scale was moderately correlated with the Rosenberg measure of personal self-esteem. Again, the Membership subscale, assessing one's evalua-

TABLE 2: Goodness of Fit Indexes of Four Models of the Collective Self-Esteem Scale Factor Structure

Model	χ^2	df	χ^2/df	NFI	NNFI	CFI
Study 1						
One-factor	1614.09	104	15.52	.67	.63	.68
Four-factor uncorrelated	1309.71	104	12.59	.73	.71	.75
Four-factor correlated	425.67	98	4.34	.91	.92	.93
Hierarchical	441.82	103	4.55	.91	.92	.93
Study 2						
One-factor	295.18	104	2.84	.53	.57	.62
Four-factor uncorrelated	251.71	104	2.42	.60	.66	.71
Four-factor correlated	162.83	98	1.66	.74	.84	.87
Hierarchical	182.55	103	1.77	.71	.82	.84
Study 3						
One-factor	523.73	104	5.04	.61	.60	.66
Four-factor uncorrelated	449.20	104	4.32	.67	.67	.72
Four-factor correlated	218.82	98	2.23	.84	.88	.90
Hierarchical	232.67	103	2.26	.83	.88	.89

NOTE: NFI and NNFI = Bentler and Bonett (1980) normed fit index and nonnormed fit index, respectively; CFI = comparative fit index (Bentler, 1990). All chi-square statistics are significant at $p < .001$. $N_s = 887, 83,$ and 180 in Studies 1, 2, and 3, respectively.

TABLE 3: Reliability Analyses of the Collective Self-Esteem Scale

Scale	Membership	Private	Public	Identity	Total
Scale <i>M</i>					
Study 1	22.67	22.85	21.44	18.73	85.69
Study 2	22.01	22.01	20.84	18.63	83.49
Study 3	22.78	23.09	21.62	19.65	87.14
Scale <i>SD</i>					
Study 1	3.42	3.45	3.95	4.95	11.67
Study 2	3.49	4.08	3.81	4.67	11.83
Study 3	3.38	3.13	3.71	4.99	11.68
Mean interitem correlation					
Study 1	.41	.45	.51	.45	.29
Study 2	.43	.54	.46	.42	.29
Study 3	.44	.42	.48	.60	.33
Mean item-total correlation					
Study 1	.52	.55	.62	.57	.49
Study 2	.54	.64	.59	.53	.49
Study 3	.55	.52	.59	.70	.53
Alpha					
Study 1	.73	.74	.80	.76	.85
Study 2	.74	.80	.78	.73	.85
Study 3	.75	.71	.78	.86	.88
Standardized item alpha					
Study 1	.73	.77	.81	.77	.87
Study 2	.75	.82	.78	.74	.86
Study 3	.76	.74	.79	.86	.89

NOTE: There are four items in each subscale. $N_s = 887, 83,$ and 180 in Studies 1, 2, and 3, respectively.

tion of the *self* in one's social groups, showed the highest correlation with personal self-esteem at $r = .42, p < .001$, and this correlation was significantly stronger (at $p < .05$

TABLE 4: Collective Self-Esteem Subscale Correlations

Scale	Private	Public	Identity	Total
Membership				
Study 1	.59**	.40**	.37**	.76**
Study 2	.58**	.28*	.47**	.77**
Study 3	.60**	.51**	.33**	.76**
Private				
Study 1		.46**	.41**	.80**
Study 2		.48**	.50**	.87**
Study 3		.51**	.53**	.83**
Public				
Study 1			.23**	.69**
Study 2			.05	.59**
Study 3			.30**	.73**
Identity				
Study 1				.73**
Study 2				.72**
Study 3				.76**

NOTE: There are four items in each subscale. $N_s = 887, 83,$ and 180 in Studies 1, 2, and 3, respectively.
* $p < .01$; ** $p < .001$.

or better) than those between the other subscales and personal self-esteem.

The Belief in Discrimination measure had a mean of 18.74 ($SD = 9.5$) and an alpha of .86. Collective Self-Esteem correlated negatively with one's belief in discrimination, and as expected, it was the Public subscale that yielded the highest negative correlations. Belief in discrimination based on race showed the highest correlation ($r = -.31$) with the Public subscale; the correlation between belief in sex discrimination and the Public subscale was

TABLE 5: Correlations Between the Collective Self-Esteem Scale and Other Measures, Study 1

Scale	Rosenberg Self-Esteem	Belief in Discrimination		
		Based on Sex	Based on Race	Total Scale
Total Collective Self-Esteem	.36**	-.06	-.17**	-.15**
Subscales				
Membership	.42**	.00	-.06	-.05
Private	.33**	-.07	-.12*	-.12*
Public	.27**	-.13*	-.31**	-.27**
Identity	.12*	.01	-.03	-.02

NOTE: Correlations with Rosenberg are based on $N = 666$; those with the total Belief in Discrimination scale are based on $N = 634$ (Sex and Race discrimination subscales $N_s = 638$ and 635 , respectively).

* $p < .01$; ** $p < .001$.

lower but also significant at $r = -.13$. The Private subscale also correlated negatively with one's belief in race discrimination.⁷ The Public subscale's correlation with belief in discrimination was significantly stronger than those of the other subscales at $p < .05$ or better.

One-way analyses of variance with race (White, Black, Asian) as the independent variable showed significant effects on the Public subscale, $F(2, 825) = 34.31, p < .001$, the Membership subscale, $F(2, 825) = 4.98, p < .01$, and the total Collective Self-Esteem Scale, $F(2, 825) = 6.19, p < .01$. The Student Newman-Keuls procedure was used to further explore the pairwise differences. As expected, Whites reported significantly higher levels of Public collective self-esteem than either of the two minority groups, with Blacks lower than Asians (all $p_s < .05$). Surprisingly, Asians were lower in Membership esteem than Whites. Contrary to expectation, minorities were not higher on the importance to Identity subscale than Whites. This may reflect a tendency on the part of Whites to think of other group memberships (e.g., gender) that are more salient or important to them than race in responding to this general scale. Although there were no other significant differences among the racial groups in their subscale scores, Whites had higher total Collective Self-Esteem scores than either of the two minority groups. The means are presented in Table 6.

We also investigated possible sex differences in collective self-esteem by conducting t tests on the subscale scores and the total score. The only significant difference between males and females was found for the Private subscale, $t(884) = 2.62, p < .01$, indicating that females judged their social groups more positively than males did ($M_s = 23.13$ and 22.54 , respectively).

Although these data provided some initial evidence for the validity of the Collective Self-Esteem Scale, we

TABLE 6: Collective Self-Esteem Scale Means for Whites, Blacks, and Asians, Study 1

Scale	Race		
	White	Black	Asian
Total Collective Self-Esteem	86.25 _a	79.90 _b	82.71 _b
Subscales			
Membership	22.78 _a	22.83 _{ab}	21.12 _b
Private	22.94 _a	22.40 _a	22.44 _a
Public	21.82 _a	16.47 _b	19.81 _c
Identity	18.72 _a	18.20 _a	19.33 _a

NOTE: Within each row, means not sharing a subscript differ at $p < .05$. Whites, $n = 755$; Blacks, $n = 30$; Asians, $n = 43$.

conducted a second study to further examine convergent and discriminant validity as well as test-retest reliability.

STUDY 2

Method

Subjects. Subjects were 83 students agreeing to participate in a "Student Survey." Seventy-three (88%) were volunteers enrolled in one of three upper-level psychology courses at a large northeastern university. Ten (12%) were obtained from the psychology department's subject pool and received credit for their participation. Of the 83, 54 (65.1%) were female, and 12 (14.5%) classified themselves in a racial category other than "White."

Materials and procedure. Subjects completed a demographic questionnaire; the Collective Self-Esteem Scale;⁸ three widely used measures of personal self-esteem: the Rosenberg (1965) Self-Esteem Scale, the Janis-Field Feelings of Inadequacy Scale (Janis & Field, 1959), and the Coopersmith (1967) Self-Esteem Inventory; the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1964); and the Breckler et al. (1986) scale measuring public, private, and collective ego task orientation and esteem.

The Janis-Field scale is a 23-item, 5-point scale developed to measure feelings of inadequacy in primarily social areas; it has a split-half reliability of .83. Fleming and Watts (1980) have demonstrated that some of the items load on a general self-regard factor and some on a social self-confidence factor; we therefore calculated a separate score for each, in addition to the total score. The Coopersmith Self-Esteem Inventory is a 50-item bipolar scale (with 8 additional social desirability items that are not calculated as a part of the score), assessing self-esteem in domains covering peers, parents, school, and personal interests. Test-retest reliability for this scale has been reported to be .88 over 5 weeks and .70 over 3

years (Coopersmith, 1967). We predicted that collective self-esteem would be significantly yet only moderately correlated with these, as well as the Rosenberg (1965), measures of personal self-esteem.

The Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale is a 33-item bipolar scale designed to assess the extent to which individuals describe themselves in favorable terms in order to gain approval from others. Crowne and Marlowe (1964) reported an internal consistency coefficient (Kuder-Richardson formula 20) of .88 and a 1-month test-retest correlation of .88 for the scale. We did not expect collective self-esteem to correlate with social desirability, particularly in an individualistic culture such as the United States.

The Breckler et al. (1986) scale has six subscales: Public, Private, and Collective Orientation scales and Public, Private, and Collective Esteem scales. The Public ego task is social accreditation (winning approval from others), the Private ego task is individual achievement, and the Collective ego task is the fulfillment of one's roles in reference groups. Items in the Public subscales include "being well dressed," "generally making a favorable first impression on others," and "having a good reputation"; those in the Private subscales include "having an active imagination," "being able to take care of oneself," and "possessing a strong sense of personal identity"; and the Collective items include "being a good representative of one's school," "being a cooperative participant in group activities," and "being active in socially important causes." For each of these ego tasks, subjects first rate the importance of the task to them (the Orientation scales) and then how well each ego task characteristic describes them (in other words, how successful they are at each ego task: the Esteem scales). Breckler et al. report subscale alphas ranging from .59 to .78.

All the scales were random-ordered and administered without prior announcement in the upper-level classes; subjects obtained from the subject pool had signed up for two sessions 6 weeks apart. All subjects were told merely that the survey concerned students' self- and social perceptions and were given approximately 1/2 hr to complete the booklet. All responses were anonymous; students were asked to indicate their city and date of birth as a code with which materials could be kept correctly matched. The Collective Self-Esteem Scale was administered again, unannounced in the classes, approximately 6 weeks later. At this second administration, 58 of the original 83 students were present. In debriefing after the second administration, subjects were simply told that the purpose of the research was to examine the test-retest reliability of the Collective Self-Esteem Scale, as well as to investigate how it correlates with other measures.

Results and Discussion

Test-retest reliability. The 6-week test-retest correlations were as follows: total scale (16 items) $r = .68$; Membership subscale $r = .58$; Private subscale $r = .62$; Public subscale $r = .66$; and Identity subscale $r = .68$. Although these correlations indicate adequate test-retest reliability, especially considering the relatively long test-retest interval, it appears that there may be some shifting in individuals' levels of collective self-esteem over a 6-week period.

Correlations with other scales. Table 7 shows the correlations between the Collective Self-Esteem Scale and other scales. The total Collective Self-Esteem Scale and three of its subscales (all except the Identity subscale) correlate significantly, though only moderately, with the Rosenberg (1965), Coopersmith (1967), and Janis-Field (1959) scales assessing personal self-esteem. The highest correlation was obtained between the Private subscale and the Coopersmith inventory ($r = .48, p < .001$). The three scales measuring personal self-esteem had inter-correlations of $r = .65$ or greater. It again appears, as expected and in line with social identity theory, that the construct of collective self-esteem is related to, yet relatively distinct from, personal self-esteem. It should be noted that the pattern of subscale correlations with personal self-esteem is somewhat different from what we found previously; here, it was the Private, rather than the Membership, subscale that had the highest correlation with the Rosenberg scale as well as with the other personal self-esteem scales. The correlations between the Private subscale and the personal self-esteem measures were significantly stronger (at $p < .05$ or better) than those between our other subscales and the personal self-esteem measures (with the exception of the Public subscale in relation to the Rosenberg and the Janis-Field scales).

None of the subscales, nor the total scale, correlated significantly with the Social Desirability Scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1964). This suggests that the Collective Self-Esteem Scale is unrelated to the tendency to describe oneself in favorable terms and to possible response biases due to social desirability.

As previously indicated, the Membership subscale was constructed with the purpose of measuring a possible aspect of collective self-esteem that would be conceptually similar to the Breckler et al. (1986) collective orientation and esteem constructs. As expected, the Membership subscale of the Collective Self-Esteem Scale, measuring how good a social group member one believes oneself to be, had higher correlations with the Breckler et al. Collective Ego Task Orientation and Collective Ego Task Esteem subscales ($r = .41$ and $.44$,

TABLE 7: Correlations Between Collective Self-Esteem Scale and Other Scales, Study 2

Scale	Collective Self-Esteem				
	Membership	Private	Public	Identity	Total
Personal self-esteem					
RSE (N = 82)	.25*	.43***	.32**	.14	.38***
SEI (N = 72)	.13	.48***	.27*	.08	.33**
J-F (N = 82)	.20*	.43***	.26**	.12	.34***
Self-Regard	.19*	.41***	.29**	.13	.34***
Social Self-Confidence	.21*	.38***	.24*	.12	.32**
Other measures					
SD (N = 77)	.09	.13	-.05	.18	.12
ETO (N = 83)					
Public	.17	-.05	-.05	.15	.08
Private	.30**	.20*	.14	.04	.22*
Collective	.41***	.35**	.06	.45***	.44***
ETE (N = 83)					
Public	.23*	.38***	.29**	.18	.36***
Private	.27**	.42***	.34**	.00	.33**
Collective	.44***	.30**	.10	.24*	.36***

NOTE: RSE = Rosenberg (1965) Self-Esteem Scale; SEI = Coopersmith (1967) Self-Esteem Inventory; J-F = Janis & Field (1959) Feelings of Inadequacy Scale; SD = Crowne & Marlowe (1964) Social Desirability Scale; ETO and ETE = Breckler, Greenwald, & Wiggins (1986) Ego Task Orientation and Ego Task Esteem scales, respectively.

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$.

respectively; $p < .001$) than with any of the other ego task subscales (these two correlations were significantly stronger, at $p < .05$, than those between the Membership subscale and the Public Ego Task subscales). The two Collective Ego Task subscales assess one's judgments of the importance of fulfilling one's role in a reference group and one's expected success at doing so. In addition, our Identity subscale, measuring how important social groups are to one's sense of self, predictably correlated (at $r = .45$, $p < .001$) with the Collective Ego Task Orientation subscale, measuring how important the collective tasks, such as being active in socially important causes, are to the respondents, and this correlation was significantly higher than the correlations of the Identity subscale with the other ego task subscales at $p < .05$ or better. There were some additional significant correlations between our and Breckler and associates' (1986) subscales (e.g., our Private subscale correlated significantly with all the Breckler et al. subscales, except for Public Ego Task Orientation), but these correlations never exceeded .45, suggesting that the scales are measuring relatively distinct constructs.

Study 3 was conducted to further investigate the relationship between our scale and other possibly related measures, including some group-oriented scales (e.g., Individualism-Collectivism), that exist in the literature.

Because the Collective Self-Esteem Scale is a general measure based on ascribed group memberships, we also decided to examine the psychometric properties of a revised form, based on one's membership in a particular achieved group. A more specific form of the Collective Self-Esteem Scale may at times be better suited for specific purposes of different investigators; for example, Ethier and Deaux (1990) have successfully used our scale specifically in reference to Hispanic identity.

STUDY 3

Method

Subjects. Subjects were 180 undergraduates enrolled in a research methods course at a large northeastern university who were unaware of the purpose of the study and who received extra credit for their participation. Among these subjects, 126 (70%) were female, and 20 (11.1%) classified themselves in a racial category other than "White."

Materials and procedure. Subjects received a random-ordered booklet consisting of a demographic questionnaire; the Collective Self-Esteem Scale (CSES); the Rosenberg (1965) Self-Esteem Scale; Hui's (1988) Individualism-Collectivism scale (INDCOL); the Cheek et al. (1985) Aspects of Identity Questionnaire III (AIQ-III); Wagner and Moch's (1986) measure assessing individualism-collectivism in the workplace (ICW); Sampson's (1978) Internal Orientation scale (IO); Maslach, Stapp, and Santee's (1985) Individuation Scale; and a revised version of the CSES (CSES-R).

The INDCOL (Hui, 1988) is a target-specific, multifaceted 63-item scale that assesses feelings, beliefs, behaviors, and behavioral intentions related to solidarity and interpersonal concern (e.g., sharing outcomes and material and nonmaterial resources) with regard to spouse, parents, kin, neighbors, friends, and co-workers. Higher scores indicate greater collectivism, low scores greater individualism. Hui reports test-retest correlations ranging from .62 (Spouse subscale) to .79 (Friend subscale) and Cronbach's alphas ranging from .41 (Spouse subscale) to .76 (Parent subscale). We predicted that collective self-esteem, especially the Identity subscale, would be moderately correlated with collectivism.

The AIQ-III (Cheek et al., 1985) is a 31-item, 5-point Likert-type scale consisting of three subscales assessing the extent to which personal (e.g., "my emotions and feelings"), social (e.g., "my reputation, what others think of me"), and collective (e.g., "my feeling of pride in my country, being proud to be a citizen") aspects of identity are important to one's sense of who one is. The authors report item loadings of above .40 on appropriate factors and subscale alpha coefficients of .84, .86, and .68 for

Personal, Social, and Collective aspects of identity, respectively (see also Cheek, 1989; Cheek & Briggs, 1982). We predicted that our Collective Self-Esteem Scale, especially the Identity subscale, would be moderately correlated with collective aspects of identity.

The ICW (Wagner & Moch, 1986) is an 11-item, 7-point Likert-type scale that assesses the extent to which organization members hold collectivistic versus individualistic assumptions regarding workplace cooperation. The scale distinguishes among beliefs, values, and norms about the extent to which cooperation in one's workplace is motivated by satisfaction of personal interests (individualism) or by satisfaction of shared interests (collectivism). The authors report confirmatory factor analysis resulting in sufficient epistemic coefficients for each subscale, but no reliability analyses. Comparisons between different employee samples provided evidence of considerable stability in the factor structure, and as expected, employees who mostly worked alone espoused greater individualism than employees who performed tasks that were conjunctive. Because collectivism in the workplace is very specific in character with regard to norms, values, and beliefs and appears to depend on what type of work one does, we did not expect it to correlate highly with our general measure of collective self-esteem based on ascribed group memberships.

The IO (Sampson, 1978) is a 15-item scale measuring an individual's overall concern for internal matters such as feelings, motivations, and personality, as well as external or environmental matters such as background or the nature of the situation, in trying to understand and explain people and their behavior. Each item presents a situation followed by an internal and an environmental alternative for how one would deal with it (e.g., by focusing on emotions and thoughts vs. external circumstances), and each alternative is rated on a 7-point scale. The internal alternatives usually indicate a focus on emotions, values, and/or personality; the environmental alternatives generally espouse a focus on the situation or circumstances. Sampson reports that internal orientation correlates positively with people's definition of their own identity in terms of internally located characteristics (e.g., one's own emotions, ideas, and values). No reliability or factor analyses were reported. Because of the wide range and the nature of Sampson's items, we did not expect collective self-esteem to correlate highly with either internal or environmental orientation.

The Individuation Scale (Maslach et al., 1985) is a 12-item, 5-point Likert-type measure that assesses people's willingness to engage in behaviors that publicly differentiate themselves from others (e.g., self-disclosure and attention-getting behaviors such as public speaking). The authors report alphas of .87 and .84 for two different

samples, a 1- to 3-week, test-retest coefficient of .91, and significant positive correlations with various measures of anticonformity and differentiation from others. It is possible that the higher individuals' collective self-esteem is, the more confident they may be in social situations, and this confidence may be manifested by a willingness to speak up, self-disclose, and so on. At times, however, high collective self-esteem may be associated with less willingness to "take the stage" as an individual and, rather, a tendency to merge with others in one's group. We therefore predicted that collective self-esteem would not show strong correlations, negative or positive, with individuation.

The revised version of CSES (i.e., CSES-R) instructed subjects to choose any particular group or organization to which they belonged at the time, to write down their choice, and to respond to the 16 items on the basis of how they felt about that group and their membership in it. A fraternity or sorority, a club or a team, an ethnic, political, volunteer, or service organization, and their place of employment were listed as examples; subjects were instructed to think of an informal group such as a group of friends or people in their dorm if they were not members of any official, organized groups. The 16 items in the general CSES were slightly reworded (e.g., "the social groups I belong to" was changed to "this group"). We predicted that our general, global Collective Self-Esteem Scale based on ascribed group memberships would be moderately correlated with this specific version based on one's esteem for an achieved group.

The questionnaires were random-ordered and distributed in class approximately half an hour before the end of the class period. Subjects were simply told that the study was an anonymous survey regarding students' social and self-perceptions, were offered extra credit toward their grade in the course in exchange for filling out the questionnaires, and were told they could stay longer if they needed more time to complete the survey. Of those not present in class that day, a small number were scheduled to complete the survey in the investigator's office within approximately a week and a half.

Results and Discussion

Correlations with other measures. In line with our prediction, CSES correlated moderately with collectivism as measured by INDCOL (Hui, 1988). As shown in Table 8, the correlation between total CSES and total INDCOL was .34 ($p < .001$), and the correlations between our subscales and total INDCOL ranged from .20 to .34. As predicted, our Identity subscale showed the generally strongest correlations with INDCOL and its subscales (although, compared with the other CSES subscales, only the correlation with the Spouse subscale was signif-

TABLE 8: Correlations Between Collective Self-Esteem Scale and Other Measures, Study 3

Measure	Collective Self-Esteem				
	Membership	Private	Public	Identity	Total
RSE (178) ^a	.38***	.22***	.19**	.06	.26***
INDCOL					
Spouse (178)	.01	.05	-.03	.30***	.13*
Parent (163)	.28***	.27***	.28***	.32***	.38***
Kin (177)	.19**	.18**	.19**	.23***	.26***
Neighbor (178)	.11	.08	.19**	.13*	.17*
Friend (170)	.13*	.18*	.25***	.20**	.25***
Co-worker (176)	.08	.14*	.11	.13*	.15*
Total (155)	.20**	.21**	.24**	.34***	.34***
AIQ-III (180)					
Personal	.14*	.13*	.08	.09	.14*
Social	.04	.03	.05	.28***	.16*
Collective	.05	.12	.03	.33***	.20**
ICW (180)					
Beliefs	.15*	.02	.09	.12	.13*
Values	.04	.09	.03	.19**	.13*
Norms	.04	.03	.05	.19**	.12
Total	.11	.06	.08	.23***	.17**
IO					
Internal (166)	.16*	.15*	.25***	.07	.20**
(161)	(.09) ^b	(.11)	(.20***)	(.08)	(.18*)
Environmental (164)	.27***	.17*	.26***	-.01	.20**
(161)	(.24***) ^c	(.14*)	(.20**)	(-.04)	(.16*)
INDIVIDUATION (178)	.37***	.19**	.17*	-.05	.19**
(173)	(.26***) ^d	(.11)	(.11)	(-.09)	(.10)

NOTE: RSE = Rosenberg's (1965) Self-Esteem Scale; INDCOL = Hui's (1988) Individualism-Collectivism scale; AIQ-III = Cheek, Underwood, & Cutler's (1985) Aspects of Identity Questionnaire III; ICW = Wagner & Moch's (1986) scale measuring individualism-collectivism in the workplace; IO = Sampson's (1978) Internal Orientation measure; INDIVIDUATION = Maslach, Stapp, & Santee's (1985) Individuation Scale.

a. Numbers in parentheses indicate the *N*.

b. Correlations in parentheses in this row indicate correlations partialing out environmental orientation.

c. Correlations in parentheses in this row indicate correlations partialing out internal orientation.

d. Correlations in parentheses in this row indicate correlations partialing out Rosenberg personal self-esteem.

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$.

icantly stronger, $p < .001$). Not all the correlations between different CSES and INDCOL subscales were significant, however; this may be partly due to college students' finding certain INDCOL items irrelevant—for example, with regard to spouse.

Total CSES correlated with the collective, social, and personal aspects of identity of AIQ-III (Cheek et al., 1985) at .20, .16, and .14. As predicted, the Identity subscale of CSES and the collective aspects of identity subscale of AIQ-III were significantly correlated at $r = .33$, $p < .001$, and this correlation was significantly higher than the correlations between the other CSES subscales and collective aspects of identity ($ps < .001$). Somewhat more surprisingly, our Identity subscale also correlated significantly with social aspects of identity at $r = .28$, $p < .001$, and none of our other subscales correlated with collective aspects of identity. This is likely to be due in

part to the different nature of these various subscales. Whereas our Identity subscale measures the extent to which social groups are important to subjects' sense of self, the rest of our subscales deal with judgments of *worthiness* or value (either of one's social groups or of the self within the social groups). The AIQ-III subscales are more similar to our Identity subscale with regard to the types of judgments made—for example, how *important* "my race or ethnic background" (collective aspect) or "my popularity with other people" (social aspect) is to one's sense of who one is. In addition, the Membership and Private subscales of CSES showed significant correlations with personal aspects of identity ($rs = .14$ and $.13$, $ps < .05$), although these correlations were not significantly stronger than those obtained for the Public and Identity subscales. Controlling for Rosenberg (1965) personal self-esteem, however, both of these correlations

drop to a nonsignificant .11, while the correlations between our Identity subscale and AIQ-III's collective and social aspects of identity remain significant at .33 and .30, respectively, $p < .001$.

Correlations between CSES subscales and the beliefs, values, and norms subscales of ICW were mostly nonsignificant. Our Identity subscale was most strongly related to ICW; as Table 8 shows, it correlated with both values and norms at $r = .19$ ($p < .01$), with beliefs at $r = .12$ ($p < .10$), and with the total ICW at $r = .23$, $p < .001$. The Identity subscale correlated significantly more strongly with the total ICW as well as the values and norms subscales than did the other CSES subscales, at $p < .15$ or better. It thus appears that the extent to which social groups in general are important to one's self-concept is related to the extent to which one holds collectivistic norms and values in the workplace.

Table 8 shows that all the CSES subscales except Identity correlated significantly with both internal and environmental orientation as measured by Sampson's (1978) IO, the highest correlation being .27 ($p < .001$) between Membership esteem and environmental orientation. Because internal and environmental orientation correlated at $r = .27$, $p < .001$, we also ran partial correlations between CSES and each type of orientation, holding the other orientation constant. As shown in Table 8, the correlations between all the subscales of CSES except for Identity and environmental orientation remained significant, while only the Public subscale of CSES still showed a significant positive correlation with internal orientation at $r = .20$, $p < .001$. Thus, collective self-esteem appears to be somewhat more related to environmental than internal orientation.

Finally, CSES and all its subscales except Identity showed significant positive correlations with individuation (Maslach et al., 1985), the highest correlation being .37 for the Membership subscale (see Table 8). Collective self-esteem thus appears to be related to one's willingness to engage in behaviors that publicly differentiate the self from others. Because Rosenberg (1965) personal self-esteem correlated with individuation at $r = .40$, $p < .001$, we expected the correlations between CSES and individuation to be partly influenced by the shared variance between CSES and personal self-esteem. Partialing out Rosenberg personal self-esteem, only the correlation between Membership esteem and individuation remains significant, at $r = .26$, $p < .001$ (this correlation being significantly stronger than those between the other CSES subscales and individuation at $p < .05$ or better), suggesting that those who rate highly their own worthiness as a member of social groups tend to be more willing to engage in individuating behaviors. Partialing out CSES, Rosenberg personal self-esteem still correlates with individuation at $r = .37$, $p < .001$. The results thus suggest that

it is the more individual components of self-esteem that are related to individuation.

The revised Collective Self-Esteem Scale. Following are the percentages of the types of groups on which subjects based their answers in responding to CSES-R: a job/work group, 21.7% ($n = 39$), a fraternity/sorority, 10% (18); a sports group/team, 7.8% (14); a religious group/church, 4.4% (8); some other official, organized group (e.g., a volunteer, service, or minority organization), 21.1% (38); a group of friends, 15% (27); and some other informal group, 3.9% (7).⁹

Principal components factor analysis using varimax rotation specifying four factors indicated that 67.4% of the variance in this revised scale was accounted for by four factors. The factor pattern was the same we found for the general CSES, and item loadings ranged from .66 to .82 on the appropriate factors. Means were 24.38 ($SD = 3.12$), 24.10 ($SD = 3.6$), 22.18 ($SD = 3.5$), 19.09 ($SD = 5.08$), and 89.75 ($SD = 11.66$) for Membership, Private, Public, Identity, and total CSES-R, respectively ($N = 177$ in all analyses). Mean interitem correlations for the subscales ranged from .48 (Public) to .70 (Private; for total scale, .34). Mean item-total correlations for the subscales ranged from .59 (Public) to .78 (Private; .55 for total scale). Alpha coefficients were .80, .90, .77, .80, and .88 for Membership, Private, Public, Identity, and total revised scale, respectively. Subscale correlations were also similar to those of the general CSES, ranging from .30 (between Public and Identity) to .60 (between Private and Identity). The psychometric properties of the revised version thus closely resemble those of the original scale, suggesting that altering the original scale for specific purposes may be acceptable, without compromising its properties.

CSES-R showed correlations with Rosenberg (1965) personal self-esteem that were similar to those of the general CSES, ranging from $r = .04$ (Identity; n.s.) to $r = .38$ (Membership; $p < .001$). The correlations between the general CSES based on ascribed group memberships and CSES-R based on a specific achieved group are as follows: Membership $r = .48$, Private $r = .40$, Public $r = .39$, Identity $r = .45$, and total scale $r = .47$ (all $p < .001$). All the other correlations between CSES and CSES-R subscales were also positive, generally in the .20s and .30s, but never exceeded the correlations between the appropriate subscales. Thus it appears that collective self-esteem based on ascribed groups may to some extent generalize to specific achieved groups, and/or vice versa.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

Results from the three studies suggest that the Collective Self-Esteem Scale can be a useful tool in future research. Exploratory factor analyses supported four

subscales (Membership esteem, Private collective self-esteem, Public collective self-esteem, and importance to Identity). Confirmatory factor analyses showed that in each of three studies, the four-factor correlated model and the hierarchical model with four first-order factors and a second-order general collective self-esteem factor both represented the data better than a one-factor model or a four-factor uncorrelated model, although none of the models yielded an excellent fit.¹⁰ Reliability of the subscales and the total CSES was demonstrated by reasonably high Cronbach's alphas and item-total correlations and adequate test-retest coefficients.

Construct validity of the scale was demonstrated by predictable correlations with other measures. Consistent with the notion that personal and collective self-esteem are distinct and yet share a common core, in each of the studies CSES and its subscales correlated positively with existing measures of personal self-esteem. In two of the three studies, the Membership subscale, which assesses the most individualistic part of social identity (one's personal worthiness as a social group member), had the highest correlation with personal self-esteem as measured by the Rosenberg (1965) scale. Validity for the Public subscale was also demonstrated in the present study by showing, in line with our prediction, that certain racial minorities (Blacks and Asians) reported lower levels of public collective self-esteem than Whites and that the subscale showed a significant negative correlation with belief in discrimination based on race and, to a smaller extent, on sex. Collective self-esteem was also shown to correlate moderately with group-oriented measures such as Hui's (1988) Individualism-Collectivism scale.

Although we developed a global collective self-esteem scale based on various ascribed group memberships, at times researchers may want to use a more specific measure based on a particular group membership. Preliminary data from Study 3 suggested that altering the scale for a specific achieved group did not compromise its psychometric properties. Recently Ethier and Deaux (1990) modified three of the CSES subscales (Private, Public, and Identity) to specifically assess collective self-esteem based on Hispanic identity and found that Hispanic females in their sample scored higher than males on the Identity subscale; in addition, for males, but not for females, strength of cultural background was significantly associated with both Private and Identity subscale scores. They found alphas ranging from .66 (Private) to .92 (Identity) for the revised scale. Future researchers may wish to examine further how the CSES relates to various social phenomena when it is revised to focus on a specific group membership.

Further support for the validity of the Collective Self-Esteem Scale was obtained in an experiment investigat-

ing the ability of the CSES to predict behavior in an intergroup context (Crocker & Luhtanen, 1990). Subjects high in private collective self-esteem (i.e., those who personally held a positive view of their ascribed in-groups) reacted to a collective threat (negative group feedback) in an in-group-enhancing fashion, and subjects low in private collective self-esteem did not. More specifically, after taking a personality test and learning that the other members in their arbitrarily assigned in-group did badly, subjects high (but not low) in private collective self-esteem undermined the differences between above-average scorers and below-average scorers on the test, compared with highs who received group success feedback. These findings were directly parallel to those of an earlier study by Crocker et al. (1987), which showed that subjects who were high in *personal* self-esteem reacted to *personal* feedback by altering their evaluations of above-average and below-average scorers in a self-enhancing manner. Thus, just as personal self-esteem, measured by the Rosenberg (1965) scale, moderated subjects' responses to threats to personal identity (i.e., to individual feedback) in the Crocker et al. study, so did private collective self-esteem moderate subjects' responses to threats to collective identity (i.e., group feedback) in the Crocker and Luhtanen (1990) study (see also Luhtanen & Crocker, 1991, for further review of this line of research).

Although the present results are encouraging, validity of the subscales and the total scale should be investigated further, particularly with regard to how each subscale moderates various social behaviors. We propose that just as personal self-esteem has been shown to be an important moderator of the extent to which individuals engage in self-serving biases and self-enhancement (see, e.g., Taylor & Brown, 1988), collective self-esteem will moderate the extent to which individuals will attempt to protect or enhance their collective identities, as the results from the Crocker and Luhtanen (1990) study suggested (see also Barnes et al., 1988; Leary, Barnes, Griebel, Mason, & McCormack, 1987, for relevant research). Tajfel and Turner (1986) outline several reactions to threatened social identity, and we predict that it is individuals characteristically high in collective self-esteem who are most likely to show many of those reactions. For example, we predict that in the face of collective threats, high collective self-esteem individuals will be more likely than lows to engage in competition with out-groups (e.g., by uneven distribution of resources), to change the out-group with which the in-group is compared (from upward comparisons to downward comparisons or comparisons with same-status out-groups), and to change their valuing process by devaluing attributes on which their group fares poorly and increasingly valuing attributes possessed by the in-group and by changing dimensions on which they make intergroup compari-

sons so as to yield more positive comparison outcomes. Low collective self-esteem individuals, in contrast, may show more in-group-*protective* or *indirect* enhancement strategies (see, e.g., Brown, Collins, & Schmidt, 1988; Snyder, Lassegard, & Ford, 1986).

We would also predict that individuals who are active in causes and activities involving their social groups (e.g., minorities who are active supporters of civil rights) would be higher in the membership, private, and identity aspects of collective self-esteem than those who are not active members. In fact, activists may show a greater discrepancy between their private and public collective self-esteem than nonactivists; it is likely that those who value their social groups but perceive that others do not hold the same opinion are more apt to do something to improve their groups' status than those who see no discrepancy between their own and others' views of their social groups.¹¹ Further, membership self-esteem is expected to show the strongest relationship to individual achievements within social groups, and those high in the identity aspect may be especially likely to associate themselves with their social groups or assert their group memberships by, for example, wearing appropriate clothing and props (e.g., shirts and buttons with group slogans).

In addition, we propose that collective self-esteem, like personal self-esteem, is associated with psychological adjustment. Preliminary support for this was obtained by Luhtanen, Blaine, and Crocker (1991), who found that both personal and collective self-esteem was negatively correlated with depression in African-American and White students. More interestingly, the negative correlation between *personal* self-esteem and depression was significantly stronger for Whites than for African-Americans, whereas *collective* self-esteem (and all its subscales) showed a stronger negative relationship to depression in African-American students, and the correlations stayed significant even after controlling for personal self-esteem. Further research on the relationship between collective self-esteem and indexes of psychological adjustment is suggested.

Perhaps most important, further research should address additional theoretical questions, such as the nature of the relationship between personal and collective self-esteem; for example, does one (or both) influence the other? What is the nature of the relationship among the four proposed facets of collective self-esteem, and might there be any other facets that the present scale does not assess? To what extent and under what conditions should collective self-esteem be treated as a trait versus a state? How is collective self-esteem acquired and modified? It is hoped that future research will be able to sharpen the construct and provide answers to these types of questions.

Psychological research on the self-concept has focused almost exclusively on one aspect of the self-concept—

personal identity. It has been proposed that another aspect of the self-concept—collective identity—is an important facet of the self. We have proposed that individuals vary in the extent to which they evaluate their social groups positively, just as they vary in the extent to which they evaluate themselves positively. Our present research provides support for the notion that collective self-esteem—the generalized tendency to evaluate one's social identity positively—can be reliably measured and is empirically distinct from, yet related to, personal self-esteem. Consistent with social identity theory, as well as current research on aspects of identity (e.g., Cheek, 1989) and individualism-collectivism (e.g., Triandis, 1989), we believe that the collective aspects of the self-concept are an important determinant of much of social behavior. The development of a scale to assess collective self-esteem should facilitate research on this topic.

NOTES

1. Interestingly, research in the United States on "basking in reflected glory" and "cutting off reflected failure" applies to this process; see, for example, Cialdini et al. (1976); Snyder, Lassegard, and Ford (1986).

2. The original 43-item scale can be obtained from the authors.

3. Both here and in Study 1, we also performed factor analyses using oblique rotation, which showed the same pattern. Results from varimax rotation are presented here because it is often preferred and generally easier to interpret (Nunnally, 1978).

4. This relatively low rate of completion was due to the fact that the mass testing package consisted of many randomly ordered questionnaires from several investigators, and most students failed to complete the whole package within the class period.

5. This scale is unpublished and available from the authors.

6. Confirmatory factor analyses, reliability analyses, and subscale correlations were also performed on the data obtained from Studies 2 and 3. To save space and make comparisons easier, all the results are included in Tables 2, 3, and 4 and will not be discussed again later.

7. The correlations between belief in discrimination based on sex and each subscale of the Collective Self-Esteem Scale (CSES) were not significantly different for males and females. We also ran correlations separately for Whites, Blacks, and Asians who completed both the CSES and the belief in discrimination measure. For Whites ($n = 554$), belief in discrimination based on race correlated negatively with Private, Public, and total CSES ($r = -.16, -.16, \text{ and } -.13$, respectively; $p < .01$) and nonsignificantly with the Membership and Identity subscales ($r = -.08$ and $-.02$, respectively). This pattern was different for Blacks and Asians. In the Black sample ($n = 25$), belief in race discrimination correlated positively with Membership, Private, and total CSES ($r = .31, .29, \text{ and } .02$, respectively) and negatively with the Public and Identity subscales ($r = -.33$ and $-.14$, respectively), but owing to the small sample size, these correlations were not significant and should be interpreted with caution. In the Asian sample ($n = 32$), none of the correlations were negative; belief in race discrimination correlated at $.37, .17, .01, .13, \text{ and } .19$ with Membership, Private, Public, Identity, and total CSES, respectively. Again, owing to the small sample size, only the correlation with the Membership subscale reached significance ($p < .05$). It appears that for minorities, but not for Whites, belief in racial discrimination is positively associated with membership and private collective self-esteem but (at least for Blacks) negatively associated with public collective self-esteem—a finding not inconsistent with Crocker and Major's (1989) analysis.

8. Subjects completed the original 43-item scale, but the results are reported for the shortened form. The pattern of results was similar for the original scale.

9. These percentages add to 83.9% ($n = 151$) of the total sample ($N = 180$). Of the missing 16.1% ($n = 29$), 3 subjects failed to respond to the scale, and the remaining 26 failed to identify the type of group on which they based their answers.

10. We additionally conducted principal components analyses on the data from Studies 1 and 3, where the N s were sufficiently large, in order to examine whether variance in items from some related scales could be explained by only one underlying component or a latent factor. In Study 1, the first principal component explained only 21.9% of the variance in the CSES, Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale, and belief in race and sex discrimination items, whereas seven components with eigenvalues greater than one accounted for 62.7% of the variance. In Study 3, a principal components analysis on the CSES, AIQ-III, and INDCOL items revealed that only 8.6% of the variance was explained by the first component, and another analysis on the CSES and Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale items showed that only 26.5% of the variance was accounted for by the first component. It thus appears that these various measures cannot be adequately subsumed by one underlying construct (e.g., a general self-esteem factor or a collectivism factor).

11. We are grateful to Sidney Shrauger for pointing out this possibility.

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