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tivism inherent in much of the earlier American research, through a judicious synthesis of sophisticated methodology with breadth of scholarship and strong theoretical frame-

works, there will be reason to believe that future historians of sociology will be compelled to give more notice to Finnish achievements than has hitherto been the case.

AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION OF SELF-ATTITUDES *

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ALTHOUGH the self has long been the central concept in the symbolic interaction approach to social psychology, little if anything has been done to employ it directly in empirical research. There are several reasons for this, one of the most important of which is that there has been no consensus regarding the class of phenomena to which the self ought to be operationally ordered. The self has been called an image, a conception, a concept, a feeling, an internalization, a self looking at oneself, and most commonly simply the self (with perhaps the most ambiguous implications of all). One of these many designations of the self has been as *attitudes*. We do not have space here to discuss the theoretical clarification which results from the conscious conceptualization of the self as a set of attitudes¹ except to point out that this conceptualization is most consistent with Mead's view of the self as an object which is in most respects like all other objects, and with his further view that an object is a plan of action (an attitude).

If, as we suppose, human behavior is *organized* and *directed*, and if, as we further suppose, the organization and direction are supplied by the individual's *attitudes toward himself*, it ought to be of crucial significance to social psychology to be able to identify and measure self-attitudes. This paper is

intended to provide an initial demonstration of the advantages to empirical research from thus treating the self as attitudes.

PROBLEMS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF A SELF-ATTITUDES TEST

The obvious first step in the application of self-theory to empirical research is the construction and standardization of a test which will identify and measure self-attitudes.

The initial consideration in designing such a test is the question of accessibility. Would people give to investigators the statements which are operative in identifying themselves and therefore in organizing and directing their behavior? Or would they be inclined to hide their significant self-attitudes behind innocuous and conventional fronts? Those following symbolic interaction orientation have apparently guessed the latter to be the case for they have seldom if ever asked direct questions regarding self-attitudes, and have tended to assemble self-attitudes of those they were studying from diverse kinds of statements and behavior through the use of long and dubious chains of inference.

One of the present authors, in an earlier attempt to identify and measure self-attitudes among groups of Amish, Mennonite and Gentile school children,² made the assumption that self-attitudes might be studied

*The investigation on which this paper is based was made possible by a grant from the Graduate College of the State University of Iowa. The paper is a part of an extended examination of self-theory given before the social psychology section of the Midwest Sociological Society at Omaha, April 25, 1953.

¹A paper dealing with this view is being prepared by the present authors for publication elsewhere.

²Manford H. Kuhn, "Family Impact upon Personality," Chapter Five of *Problems in Social Psychology: An Interdisciplinary Inquiry*, edited by J. E. Hulett, Jr. and Ross Stagner, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1953, esp. pp. 50-52. A more comprehensive report of this study is to be included in a symposium on culture and personality, edited by Francis L. K. Hsu, to be published in the spring of 1954.

in a fairly direct manner by collecting statements of role preference and role avoidance, role expectations, models for the self, and the like. While this investigation yielded results which corresponded to the cultural differences involved, it was clear that the self-statements which the children gave were specific to the role situations asked for and that therefore *general* self-attitudes still had to be (somewhat tenuously) inferred from them.

Subsequent pilot studies were made comparing the contents of extended autobiographies of university students with paragraphs written in answer to the question "Who are you?" These paragraphs contained virtually all the items which were yielded by rough content analyses of the self-attitudes in their corresponding autobiographies. This applied to painful and self-derogatory materials as well as to self-enhancing materials. Thus we concluded that it might be profitable to construct a test which was aimed directly at self-attitudes.³

The device which we then used, and upon the use of which this research report is in major part based, consisted of a single sheet of paper headed by these instructions:

"There are twenty numbered blanks on the page below. Please write twenty answers to the simple question 'Who am I?' in the blanks. Just give twenty different answers to this question. Answer as if you were giving the answers to yourself, not to somebody else. Write the answers in the order that they

³ The social scientist, unlike the Freudian, assumes that most human behavior is organized and directed by internalized but consciously held role recipes. See, for example, Theodore Newcomb, *Social Psychology*, New York: Dryden, 1950, for his excellent discussion of the relation of attitudes and symbols to the *direction* of behavior (pp. 77-78, 82), and his discussion of the *directive* (versus the expressive) organization of behavior (pp. 343-344). Those absorbed in the present fashion of projective testing would seem to have the cart before the horse, for relatively few of their subjects have been studied in terms of their directive and overt attitudes. It would seem much more reasonable to run out the implications of findings from tests of such attitudes before attempting to uncover deeplying, unconscious or guarded attitudes. We have concluded that much time is wasted debating *in advance* to what extent people will hide their "true attitudes," whether they be self-attitudes or attitudes toward other objects or states of affairs.

occur to you. Don't worry about logic or 'importance.' Go along fairly fast, for time is limited."

APPLICATION OF THE "TWENTY-STATEMENTS" TEST

This test was given to 288 undergraduate students at the State University of Iowa. It was administered during regular class meetings of introductory courses given in the Department of Sociology and Anthropology at various times during the spring of 1952. In a few classes the instructions were presented orally rather than in writing. In every instance students were given twelve minutes in which to complete the test. The students were naïve in the sense that they had not received instruction in the area to which this research was directed.

The number of responses per respondent evoked by these instructions varied from the twenty requested to one or two (with the median being seventeen responses). The responses took the general form "I am . . ." Frequently "I am" was omitted, the responses consisting of phrases (*e.g.*, "a student," "an athlete," "a blonde") or of single words (*e.g.*, "girl," "married," "religious.").

The responses were dealt with by a form of content analysis. They were categorized dichotomously either as *consensual* references or as *subconsensual* references.⁴ These content categories distinguish between statements which refer to groups and classes whose limits and conditions of membership are matters of common knowledge, *i.e.*, *consensual*; and those which refer to groups, classes, attributes, traits or any other matters which would require interpretation by the respondent to be precise or to place him relative to other people, *i.e.*, *subconsensual*. Examples of the consensual variety are "student," "girl," "husband," "Baptist," "from Chicago," "pre-med," "daughter," "oldest child," "studying engineering"; that is, statements referring to consensually defined statuses and classes. Examples of the subconsensual category are "happy," "bored," "pretty good student," "too heavy," "good

⁴ The precise working definitions of the two categories are given in detail in Thomas S. McPartland, *The Self and Social Structure: An Empirical Approach*, Iowa City: State University of Iowa Library, 1953, p. 147, Ph.D. Dissertation, microfilm.

wife," "interesting"; that is, statements without positional reference, or with references to consensual classes obscured by ambiguous modifiers.

The assignment of responses to these dichotomous content categories was highly reliable between different analysts, differences in categorization between two judges occurring less than three times in one hundred responses.

When the content was dichotomized in this way several interesting and useful features emerged:

First, from the ordering of responses on the page it was evident that *respondents tended to exhaust all of the consensual references they would make before they made (if at all) any subconscious ones*; that is, having once begun to make subconscious references they tended to make no more consensual references (if indeed they had made any at all). This ordering of responses held whether a respondent made as many as nineteen consensual references or as few as one.

Second, the number of consensual references made by respondents varied from twenty to none. Similarly the number of subconscious references made by respondents varied from twenty to none. However, the number of consensual and subconscious references made by any given respondent did not stand in a simple arithmetic relation (such as the number of consensual references plus the number of subconscious references equals twenty). This resulted from the fact that many respondents made fewer than twenty statements. For example, a respondent might make ten consensual statements and then leave the remaining ten spaces blank, while another might make two consensual references, twelve subconscious references, and then leave the last six spaces blank.⁵ In the analysis on which this report is based, all consensual references are on

one side of the dichotomy, while "no-responses" are combined with subconscious references on the other. An individual's "locus score" is simply the number of consensual references he makes on the "Twenty-Statements" Test.

These characteristics of the responses to the "Twenty-Statements" Test satisfy the definition of a Guttman scale. "The scalogram hypothesis is that the items have an order such that, ideally, *persons who answer a given question favorably all have higher ranks on the scale than persons who answer the same question unfavorably.*"⁶ In applying this criterion it is necessary to keep in mind that "a given question" refers in this case to a specified one (by order) of the twenty statements, and that a "favorable response" would refer to a statement with a consensual reference—one that places the individual in a social system.

"The items used in a scalogram analysis must have a special *cumulative property.*"⁷ Again it must be kept in mind that "the items" must in this case be interpreted in terms of the content analysis and not in terms of the raw responses to the open-ended question. Since a person who, let us say, makes a consensual statement as his seventh has also (in more than ninety per cent of the instances) made consensual statements in his first six, and since "consensuality" or "locus" refers to anchorage or self-identification in a social system, a variable which is numerically cumulative, we may regard the criterion of cumulativeness as being satisfied in this test. Guttman states, "A third equivalent definition of a scale is the one upon which our practical scalogram analysis procedures are directly based. It requires that each person's responses should be reproducible from the rank alone. A more technical statement of the condition is that each item shall be a simple function of the persons' ranks."⁸ This is true for the test under consideration.

⁵ The variables which result from these characteristics of responses to the "Twenty-Statements" Test are presently being utilized in further research with special reference to clinical use. There are some interesting indications that those with few if any *consensual* statements to make have symptoms of emotional disturbance, while those having few statements of *any kind* to make are of Riesman's "radar" type, taking their cues from each specific situation, and (in the phrase of John

Gould) "taking their 'immediate others' to be their 'significant others.'"

⁶ S. A. Stouffer, L. Guttman, E. A. Suchman, P. F. Lazarsfeld, S. A. Star, and J. A. Clausen, *Studies in Social Psychology in World War II, Volume IV: Measurement and Prediction*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950, p. 9.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 62.

Scores can therefore be assigned which indicate not only *how many* consensual references were made by each respondent, but *which* of his responses fell into the consensual category. The coefficient of reproducibility for this scale, based on 151 respondents, is .903. The test-retest reliability of the scale scores is approximately +.85.

Both for convenience and because consensual references are references to subjective identification by social position we

no consensual statements, thus giving a perfect coefficient of reproducibility, 1.00.

VALIDITY OF THE TEST

The problem of validity of a test in a hitherto uninvestigated area is a difficult one. There are generally recognized to be two related but distinct methods of assessing validity. One is by examining the logical relatedness of the test with the body of theory on which it rests. This subsumes the test of validity by correlating test results

TABLE 1. THE SCALE OF LOCUS, SHOWING SCALE-TYPES, FREQUENCY, TOTAL RESPONSES¹ IN EACH SCALE TYPE AND THE COEFFICIENT OF REPRODUCIBILITY FOR EACH SCALE TYPE

Scale Type	Frequency	Total Response	Errors	C. R.
20	19	380	41	.892
19	5	100	13	.870
18	1	20	1	.950
17	4	80	7	.913
16	1	20	3	.850
15	6	120	24	.800
14	8	160	9	.937
13	8	160	19	.875
12	4	80	10	.875
11	13	260	21	.915
10	7	140	15	.893
9	9	180	19	.895
8	9	180	15	.912
7	7	140	9	.936
6	10	200	15	.925
5	11	220	24	.891
4	8	160	11	.932
3	12	240	24	.900
2	2	40	5	.875
1	4	80	8	.900
0	3	60	0	1.000
	151	3020	293	.903

¹ Includes failure to respond to a blank as a response.

have called the consensual-subconsensual variable the *locus* variable. Table 1 is a summary of the "scale of locus," and shows among other things the number of respondents approximating each scale type. For example, the first row in Table 1 indicates that 19 respondents most closely approximated Scale Type 20, *i.e.*, making twenty statements of the consensual reference variety. Of their 380 responses there were 41 errors (that is, randomly distributed nonconsensual statements), giving a coefficient of reproducibility of .892 for this scale type. At the other end of the scale there were three respondents who belonged in Scale Type 0, which is that of making

with the criterion behavior indicated by the theory. The other method is through correlation of the results of the test with other (already standardized) tests of the problem under investigation. When—as in this case—an area has not been previously investigated by inductive research there are no other tests to use as correlational checks. We need not be held up unduly by this consideration, however, for this is apparently a very much misused method of assessing validity in the field of personality research.⁹

⁹ There has been a considerable tendency to validate each new personality test by correlating its results with those obtained by the already existent ones, without inquiring into *their* validity.

There are two kinds of demonstration required to deal properly with the problem of the consistency of the test with its antecedent body of orientational theory. One is that of making explicit the chains of logic which went into the designing of the test, the test operations and the manipulations of the data obtained through its application. The other is that of showing that the test results correlate in some consistent patterns with the kinds of behavior which the orientation asserts are related.

With respect to the first kind of demonstration we need indicate only that the question "Who am I?" is one which might logically be expected to elicit statements about *one's identity*; that is, his social statuses, and the attributes which are in his view relevant to these. To ask him to give these statements "as if to himself" is an endeavor to obtain from him *general* self-attitudes rather than simply ones which might be idiosyncratic to the test situation or those which might be uniquely held toward himself in his relation to the test administrator. The request in the test for as many as twenty statements of self-identity stems from a recognition by the investigators of the *complex* and *multifarious* nature of an individual's statuses, their curiosity re-

garding the question of whether the *ordering of responses* correlates with the individual's particular anchoring in society, and their interest in exploring the *range* of self-attitudes.

The manipulation of the responses by assigning them to dichotomous categories, that of consensual reference and that of subconsensual reference, rests on the self-theory view that the self is an interiorization of one's positions in social systems. One may assume from this orientation that variations in such self-identifications are equivalents of variations in the ways in which the individuals in a society such as ours have cast their lot within the range of possible reference groups.

There is an alternative hypothetical mechanism which might be advanced to explain the salience of the consensual reference statement. It is this: our society requires such a volume of census information from its citizens that the salience of consensual references in the replies to the "Twenty-Statements" Test is, according to this hypothesis, simply a superficial carry-over from other questionnaires and forms. On this view those responses which are treated in our investigation as subconsensual are "deeper" self-attitudes, and hence those which lie closer to the "authentic individual."

We do not agree with this view. It is our belief that the ordering of responses is a reflection of the make-up of the self-conception.¹⁰ The fact that the volume of

See Leonard W. Ferguson, *Personality Measurement*, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1952. Ferguson points out (p. 178) that the Bernreuter Personality Inventory was validated by correlating its scales with scores on the Allport Ascendance-Submission scale, the Bernreuter Self-Sufficiency Scale, the Laird Introversive-Extroversive Schedule and the Thurstone Personality Inventory. The correlations were high. But the Laird and Thurstone tests had been through *no validation process whatsoever*, and the other two were unsatisfactorily validated! He points out, later, that the Bell Adjustment Inventory was validated against the Allport, Thurstone and Bernreuter tests (p. 232), thus pyramiding still another validation on the original shaky base. And so it goes until people have completely forgotten all details of the construction of the earliest tests on whose validity the whole series rests as far as this variety of validation is concerned.

We should note parenthetically that we were not interested in validating this test operation of ours against any of the existent personality tests not alone for the reasons involved in the argument above, but more basically because these other tests were designed from orientations quite foreign to ours. One has only to check the items on any current personality test to see how seldom is there any logical relation to self-theory.

¹⁰ In the ordering of responses we are dealing essentially with the dimension of *salience* of self-attitudes. Theodore Newcomb (in his *Social Psychology*, New York: Dryden, 1950, p. 151) says of salience that it "refers to a person's readiness to respond in a certain way. The more salient a person's attitude the more readily will it be expressed with a minimum of outer stimulation. It seems reasonable to assume that a very salient attitude—one expressed with great spontaneity—has more importance for the person expressing it than does an attitude which he expresses only after a good deal of prodding or questioning. The weakness of direct questions is that they provide no way of measuring the salience of an attitude; we never know whether the attitude would have been expressed at all, or in the same way, apart from the direct question." Thus when a respondent, in reply to the "Who am I?" question on the "Twenty-Statements" Test, writes "I am a man," "I am a student," "I am a football player," it is

consensual responses (corresponding to social anchorings) varies greatly from respondent to respondent is taken to give indirect confirmation of our position. Another and more direct empirical confirmation is to be found in the fact that three- and four-year-old children when asked "Who are you?" give, in addition to their names, their sex and occasionally their ages; in their instances one cannot allege a carry-over from the giving of census data. Of course only the pragmatic success or failure of the technique here under consideration will give a dependable answer, and the latter part of this report is devoted to an account of one such pragmatic test. This pragmatic test of the usefulness of the scale scores of the "locus" component of self-attitudes may serve also as the second kind of demonstration of the validity of the instrument.

VARIATIONS IN SELF-ATTITUDES BY "KNOWN GROUPS"

The behavior which we tested for correlation with locus scores derived from our self-attitudes test is that of differential religious affiliation. It is simply one of a multitude of possible investigations which now need to be undertaken to answer the larger question "What values of this variable (locus) are related to what kinds of behavior and to what trains of social experience?"

Our orientation indicates that the self-conception should vary with differential social anchorage in (a) large, conventional, "respectable," accepted and influential groups; (b) small, weak or different, ambivalently viewed, marginal or dissident groups; or (c) no groups at all (in institutional areas in which a large fraction of the society's membership belongs and is identified by status in one or another of the existent groups). Religious groups and corresponding affiliation by our respondents fitted this model admirably so that we might check differentials in their self-attitudes

against differentials in their religious group affiliations. Some religious groups in our society are "majority groups," while others are groups whose subcultures contain norms which set their members at odds with the norms of the larger society. Then, too, a large fraction of the population either has no religious reference group or no religious group membership.

Reports of membership in religious groups in our sample were collected by means of the direct question: "What is your religious affiliation or preference?" The numbers of each variety of affiliation are given in the column under the heading "N" in Table 2. The mean locus scale scores were computed for each of these religious groups and are given in the next column. The mean scale scores ranged from 11.89 (for Catholics) to 5.75 (for "nones"). These scale scores are simply the mean number of consensual reference statements made by respondents in each of the religious groups.

Analysis of variance revealed a relation between religious affiliation and scale scores significant beyond the one per cent level. The differences between group means of Roman Catholics on the one hand and Methodists, Presbyterians, and persons reporting no affiliation on the other, were significant beyond the two per cent level. Taking the group reporting no affiliation as the base, we found significant differences between this group-mean and the group-means of Roman Catholics, "small sects," "Protestants," Congregationalists, Lutherans, Christians and Jews. Although the N's were relatively large, Methodists and Presbyterians did not differ significantly from "nones" at any usually accepted level of statistical significance. The results of this analysis appear in the last two columns in Table 2.

These results indicate clear differences in the relative strength of the more directly socially anchored component of the self-conception among affiliates of certain religious subcultures, but leave open the question of the antecedent correlates of these differences. If one postulates that Roman Catholics have in common with members of small Protestant denominations, Lutherans and Jews the characteristic that religious

reasonable to believe that we have far more solid knowledge of the attitudes which organize and direct his behavior than if, on a checklist and among other questions, we had asked "Do you think of yourself as a man?" "Do you think of yourself as a student?" and "Do you think of yourself as an athlete?"

affiliation is picked out as "important" and differentiating; and that Methodists, Presbyterians, and "indifferentists" have in common the characteristic that religious affiliation is not "important" or that it is taken for granted, then the two clusters of denominations by scale scores make sense.

If this postulate is sound, then Roman Catholics, Jews and members of small sects should carry religious references more saliently in the self-conception. The "Twenty-Statements" Test provides data on this point.¹¹

in first place being scored 20, mention in last place scoring 1, and omission of reference to religious affiliation arbitrarily scored zero.

The mean salience of religious references on the "Twenty-Statements" Test ranged from 7.4 for Roman Catholics to 1.82 for "Christians." Analysis of variance of religious references showed salience scores to be related to religious affiliation beyond the one per cent level. The analysis of the significance of the difference between group means appears in Table 3.

TABLE 2. VARIATIONS IN SELF-ATTITUDES BY RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF OBSERVED DIFFERENCES BETWEEN LOCUS SCORES OF AFFILIATES OF VARIOUS RELIGIOUS DENOMINATIONS

Denomination	N ¹	Denominational Mean	Significance of Difference ²	Significance of Difference ³
Roman Catholic	38	11.89	..	P < .001
"Small Sects" ⁴	20	11.00	not sig.	P < .01
"Protestant"	21	10.47	not sig.	P < .01
Congregationalist	13	10.30	not sig.	P < .01
Lutheran	33	10.09	not sig.	P < .01
"Christian"	11	9.81	not sig.	P < .02
Jewish	19	9.57	not sig.	P < .05
Methodist	73	8.94	P < .02	not sig.
Presbyterian	32	8.18	P < .01	not sig.
"None"	28	5.75	P < .001*	..

¹ The total N is 288. These 288 include the 151 on whom the locus scale, reported in Table 1, was established, plus 137 cases obtained subsequently.

² Computed from the Roman Catholic group mean as the base.

³ Computed from the group mean of "Nones" as the base.

⁴ Includes Baptists, Episcopalians, Evangelicals, Mennonites, Nazarenes, Reorganized Latter Day Saints, Unitarians.

* While this and the other measures of statistical significance of difference are such as to give great confidence that the differences are not due to chance, it will only be through repeated correlations of locus scores with other behavior with respect to representative samples that we will be able to discover the theoretical import of the *magnitude* of the difference.

The salience of a self-reference may be understood as the relative spontaneity with which a particular reference will be used as an orientation in the organization of behavior.¹² In this research salience of religious reference in the self-conception was measured by the rank of religious reference (if any was made) on the page of twenty statements, mention of religious affiliation

TABLE 3. DIFFERENTIAL SELF-ANCHORAGE IN RELIGIOUS GROUPS: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF OBSERVED DIFFERENCES BETWEEN MEAN SALIENCE SCORES OF RELIGIOUS REFERENCES AMONG AFFILIATES OF VARIOUS RELIGIOUS DENOMINATIONS

Denomination	Denominational Mean	Significance of Difference ¹
Roman Catholic	7.39	..
Lutheran	7.09	not significant
"Small Sects"	7.04	not significant
Jewish	6.68	not significant
Congregationalist	5.54	not significant
Presbyterian	4.47	P < .01
Methodist	3.22	P < .01
"Christian"	1.82	P < .01

¹ Computed from the Roman Catholic group mean as a base.

¹¹ This, obviously, is a use of data from the "Twenty-Statements" Test in an altogether different way than through the use of them to obtain locus scores. There are, in fact, almost unlimited numbers of ways in which these self-statements may be treated, but each would constitute essentially a new test.

¹² The comments and quotation in footnote 10 above apply equally here.

TABLE 4. REFERENCE GROUP EVIDENCE: THE DICHOTOMOUS DIVISION OF 116 RESPONDENTS ON THE BASIS OF RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION AND IDENTIFICATION WITH RELIGIOUS GROUPS

	Religious Reference Present	Religious Reference Absent	
Catholics and Jews	13 (5.5)	7 (14.5)	20
All others	19 (26.5)	77 (69.5)	96
Total	32	84	116

Chi Square: 17.03

Q: .875

P less than .0001

A completely independent operation was conducted to test this finding of the relation between the social "importance" of group affiliation and "importance" in the self-conception; 116 undergraduates, whose religious affiliations were known, were asked to answer one of two alternative "reference-group" questions: "With what groups do you feel most closely identified?" or "I am proudest of my membership in _____." When respondents were cross-classified (a) by religious affiliation and (b) by their giving or not giving religious affiliation references in response to these direct questions, Table 4 resulted. Since we had obtained, from the self-attitudes research done previously, an empirically derived gradient of "differentism," we used this to make a finer subdivision of these responses, which yielded Table 5.

These independently-derived data support the hypothesized relation between

TABLE 5. REFERENCE GROUP EVIDENCE ON THE GRADIENT OF DIFFERENTISM: THE DICHOTOMOUS DIVISION OF RESPONDENTS BY RELIGIOUS IDENTIFICATION AGAINST A TRICHOTOMOUS DIVISION BY RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION

	Religious Reference Present	Religious Reference Absent	
Catholics and Jews	13 (6.2)	7 (13.8)	20
"Small Sects"	9 (6.2)	11 (13.8)	20
"Large Denominations"	10 (19.6)	53 (43.4)	63
Total	32	71	103

Chi Square: 19.45

T: .37

P less than .0001

salience in the self-conception and socially defined importance of group membership at high levels of statistical significance.

CONCLUSIONS

The evidence provided by the "Twenty-Statements" Self-Attitudes Test and by its application to "known groups," in this case religious groups, gives support to the following empirically grounded inferences which have, in our view, rather large theoretical implications:

(1) The consensual (more directly socially anchored) component of the self-conception is the more salient component. Stated differently, consensually supported self-attitudes are at the top of the hierarchy of self-attitudes.

(2) Persons vary over a rather wide range in the relative volume of consensual and sub-consensual components in their self-conceptions. It is in this finding that our empirical investigation has given the greatest advance over the purely deductive and more or less literary formulations of George Herbert Mead. Stated in terms of the language of this test, people have locus scores which range from 0 to 20. The variable involved here is one which we can correlate with a wide variety of other attitudes and behavior.

(3) The variation indicated in (1) and (2) can be established and measured by the empirical techniques of attitude research—specifically, the Guttman scaling technique. This gives a dual advantage in that it furthers the presumption that the locus variable is a unitary one and also in that it facilitates the further manipulation of values of the variable with respect to other quantitative problems.

(4) Locus scores vary with religious affiliation, as our initial validation test shows, members of the "differentistic" religious groups having significantly higher locus scores than do members of the "conventional" religious groups (using an independent source of information to establish the fact of membership in religious groups).

(5) Religious affiliation references are significantly more salient among the self-attitudes of members of "differentistic" religious groups than among members of "majority" or conventional religious groups.

(6) Corroboratively, the religious group as a reference group appears far more frequently as an answer to a direct, reference-group type of question among those made by members of "differentistic" religious groups.

This is a first (and only partially completed) effort to build a personality test consistent with the assumptions and findings of social science. The social science view is that people organize and direct their behavior in terms of their subjectively defined identifications. These in turn are seen as internalizations of the objective social statuses they occupy, but for prediction we need to have the *subjective* definitions of identity, in view of the looseness between the social systems and the individual occupants of statuses in them in a society such as ours, characterized by alternatives, change, and collective behavior—in short, a

society toward the secular end of the scale. Our test elicits these self-definitions.

To complete a comprehensive personality test on this basis we will need to know, in addition to the subjects' subjective identifications in terms of statuses, their roles, role preferences and avoidances and role expectations, their areas of self-threat and vulnerability, their self-enhancing evaluations, their patterns of reference-group election (their "negative others" as well as their "positive others"), and probably their self-dissociated attitudes. Questions such as "What do you do?" "Who do you wish you were?" "What do you intend to do?" "What do you take the most pride in?" "As a member of what groups or categories would you like to count yourself?" are a few of the indicated types in the directions suggested of building a soundly grounded approach to a science of personality and culture.

CLASS, LEISURE, AND SOCIAL PARTICIPATION *

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IN the course of an investigation into levels of aspiration and social class,¹ the decision was made to include materials on leisure activity and social participation because of their special relevance to the general problem. Some of the impetus for designing the study to include these materials came from the availability of a substantial amount of related information and evidence on the subject.² The combined

findings of a number of separate studies seemed clearly to support the existence of a positive relationship between social class position on the one hand, and the character and extent of leisure activity and social participation on the other. Those in "higher" class positions were more active and diverse in their participation than those in "lower" positions. Phrased in somewhat less rigorous terms, this can be interpreted to mean that the middle class³ generally tends to domi-

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¹ Leonard Reissman, "Levels of Aspiration and Social Class," *American Sociological Review*, 11 (June, 1953), pp. 233-242.

² The following are referred to: W. A. Anderson, "Family Social Participation and Social Status Self-Ratings," *American Sociological Review*, 11 (June, 1946), pp. 253-258; Floyd Dotson, "Patterns of Voluntary Association Among Urban Working-Class Families," *American Sociological Review*, 16 (October, 1951), pp. 687-693; Gene-

vieve Knupfer, "Portrait of the Underdog," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, (Spring, 1947), pp. 103-114; Mirra Komarovsky, "The Voluntary Associations of Urban Dwellers," *American Sociological Review*, 11 (December, 1946), pp. 686-698; Olaf F. Larson, "Rural Community Patterns of Social Participation," *Social Forces*, 16 (March, 1938), pp. 385-388; William G. Mather, Jr., "Income and Social Participation," *American Sociological Review*, 6 (June, 1941), pp. 380-383; Gresham M. Sykes, "The Differential Distribution of Community Knowledge," *Social Forces*, 29 (May, 1951), pp. 376-382.

³ This is not the place to become overwhelmed by the variety of theory and procedure in design-